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Asymmetric *Istinbāṭ* and Platform Performativity: Fatwa Mediatization, Scriptural Compression, and the Paradox of Religious Authority in Indonesia

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Abstract
Studies on online fatwas typically examine religious authority through the lens of actors, formats, or audience responses, while the underlying processes of *istinbāṭ* (legal reasoning) demonstrated within them are seldom analyzed in depth. This qualitative case study and non-participatory netnography investigates fourteen collaborative Instagram posts by @dewanfatwapa and @fatwatv, which include thirteen fatwas issued by Al-Irsyad's Fatwa Council and 196 follower comments. Grounded in *uṣūl al-fiqh* (Islamic legal theory) and social media logic, the findings reveal that the presence of *naṣṣ* (scriptural text) is primarily influenced by the format and type of question posed. Asymmetry emerges in the management of risk within inherently permissible matters (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*): risks to collective systems are mitigated through *takyīf*, procedural measures, and positive law, whereas risks to personal choices are heightened through *iḥtiyāṭ* (legal caution) and *sadd al-żarīʿah* (blocking the means). Both approaches obscure the analytical reasoning connecting texts and rulings, leaving to perform this reasoning in the comment sections. Ultimately, the paradoxes of digital fatwa authority reside within the displayed *istinbāṭ* (legal derivation) mechanisms, rather than solely in the dynamics between scholars and platforms.

Keywords: *Digital Fatwa, Istinbāṭ, Religious Authority, Social Media Logic, Instagram, al-Irsyad.*

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Introduction

As a genre of Islamic law, the fatwa originates from a dialogical relationship: the petitioner presents a specific situation, and the mufti connects it to *naṣṣ* (scriptural text)

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through methodologically sound reasoning.[1] On social media, this relationship transforms. The Q&A format, which originally allowed space for explanation and clarification, is compressed into short-form units broadcast unidirectionally to an unfamiliar audience and evaluated through metrics. Fatwas shift from dialogical conversations to monological, performative acts. This shift is typically analyzed through debates on digital religious authority, which Cheong categorizes into three logics: disjunction and displacement, viewing media as eroding traditional authority; continuity and complementarity, viewing authority as utilizing media; and dialectics and paradox, viewing both forces operating simultaneously.[2] All three logics inquire into who holds authority and how their position shifts. A less frequently posed question is what happens to the substance of the legal reasoning itself—namely, the nexus between *naṣṣ*, methodological reasoning, and legal rulings—when fatwas are produced as micro-content designed to be briefly viewed, liked, and quantified.

This question is evident in the posts of the Fatwa Council of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad, distributed alongside FatwaTV via Instagram's collaboration feature. Three posts illustrate three distinct modes of compression. First, the 13th Assembly ruling on BPJS Kesehatan is presented in a video lasting approximately three minutes as a numbered decree, preceded by the formula "after assembling and deliberating in light of the textual evidences," without citing a single explicit scriptural text, subsequently classifying the program as *taʿāwunī* (mutual aid) insurance.[3] What is compressed here is the analytical layer, as the assembly's background paper was not uploaded. Second, a fatwa on female Muslim selfies urges the public to refrain from liking selfie content that opens avenues for temptation (*fitnah*). Yet the video—delivered by a male scholar—circulated across three collaborative accounts, gathering around 1,800 likes.[4] This irony does not violate the *'illah* (ratio legist) of the fatwa but it demonstrates that fatwas circulate through the very mechanisms they seek to regulate. Third, an answer regarding congregants following an imam reading *qunūt* during the dawn prayer was cut from a live Q&A into a clip under two minutes, attracting

[1] Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, "Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation," in *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1996), 3.

[2] Pauline Hope Cheong, "Authority," in *Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in Digital Media*, ed. Heidi A. Campbell and Ruth Tsuria (London: Routledge, 2022), 95.

[3] Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan," Instagram Video, August 14, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/reel/DNUCqgAz2nw/ .

[4] Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie," Instagram Video, August 22, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/reel/DNor03mzSGn/ .

123 comments—many of which attempted to reconstruct the petitioner's context, which was invisible in the clip.[5] The omission of analytical layers, the irony between message and circulation, and the decontextualization of petitioners are not entirely dictated by the platform; some stem from institutional decisions regarding what to publish. These three cases thus raise fundamental questions about which aspects of *istinbāṭ* (legal reasoning) are shaped by the institution and which are conditioned by the medium.

Relevant literature can be categorized into three main streams. The first stream, focusing on Salafism and the state, examines how Salafi movements align piety with citizenship, institutionalize obedience to rulers as doctrine, and purify practices by rejecting local traditions.[6] This stream analyzes doctrine and political relations but relies primarily on offline lectures, organizations, and discourses rather than fatwas circulated on digital platforms. The second stream, centered on digital da'wah, highlights the emergence of visual preachers, concerns over *riyā'* (showing off), and Islamic study apps.[7] While this stream addresses who appears and how piety is performed, but it leaves the legal reasoning behind the responses largely unexplored. The third stream, studies on digital fatwas, is most closely related to this article. Zuhri et al. analyze the transformation of fatwa authority in the social media era, Maulana et al. trace how platform logic reconfigures the legal authority of *kyai*; and Hasyim demonstrates the role of national council fatwas in reinforcing conservatism.[8] These studies treat fatwas as products that are

[5] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?," Instagram Video, October 7, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/DeL-1ChpdoL/ .

[6] Chris Chaplin, "Salafi Islamic Piety as Civic Activism: Wahdah Islamiyah and Differentiated Citizenship in Indonesia," *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (2018): 208–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1445488; Sunarwoto, "Negotiating Salafī Islam and the State: The Madkhaliyya in Indonesia," *Die Welt des Islams* 60, no. 2–3 (2020): 205–34, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-06023P03; Emad Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) .

[7] Eva F. Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Daʿwa: The Visual Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia," *Asiascape: Digital Asia* 5, no. 1–2 (2018): 68–99, https://doi.org/10.1163/22142312-12340085; Fatimah Husein and Martin Slama, "Online Piety and Its Discontent: Revisiting Islamic Anxieties on Indonesian Social Media," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 46, no. 134 (2018): 80–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2018.1415056; Moch Fakhruroji, "Digitalizing Islamic Lectures: Islamic Apps and Religious Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia," *Contemporary Islam* 13, no. 2 (2019): 201–15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-018-0427-9.

[8] Saifuddin Zuhri et al., "Transforming Religious Authority: Fatwas in the Social Media Era," *Yudisia: Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum dan Hukum Islam* 17, no. 1 (2026): 175, https://doi.org/10.21043/yudisia.v17i1.34568; Moh. Lutfi Maulana et al., "Kyai, Platform Logic, and Digital Fatwas: Reconfiguring Islamic Legal Authority in Indonesia," *Jurnal Indo-Islamika* 16, no. 1 (2026): 124–45, https://doi.org/10.15408/jii.v16i1.51745; Syafiq

received, rejected, or legitimized, but they have yet to examine which *uṣūl* (principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) mechanisms are visible in a given fatwa, which analytical layers remain hidden, and by whom those layers are set aside. It is precisely at this intersection that this article offers novelty: digital fatwa authority is analyzed through the displayed structure of *istinbāṭ* (legal reasoning), rather than merely through the actors delivering it.

This article aims to explain what happens to the *istinbāṭ* of the Fatwa Council of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad when its fatwas are circulated on Instagram. This objective is addressed through three research questions: First, which *uṣūl al-fiqh* mechanisms are evident in the circulating fatwas, and how are they distributed according to subject matter, post format, mufti type, and question type? Second, which analytical layers are absent in each format, and do their omission result from institutional decisions or platform processing? Third, how do followers respond to these analytical gaps in the comment section? This article argues that the *uṣūl* mechanisms in circulating fatwas are deployed asymmetrically when managing risk in inherently permissible matters, and that the Instagram formats chosen by the institution obscure this asymmetry difficult to discern within a single post. Consequently, the tension that Cheong conceptualizes as dialectical and paradoxical logic resides not only in the relationship between scholars and platforms but also within the very choice of *istinbāṭ* mechanisms displayed to the public.[9]

Conceptual Framework

This analysis is based on a three-tiered distinction of *istinbāṭ* established within the *uṣūl al-fiqh* tradition. The first tier is evidence (*dalīl*), which includes *naṣṣ* and other foundational sources of law. The second tier involves the analytical reasoning that connects evidence to specific cases: the mode of textual derivation (*wajh al-dalālah*), the categorization of novel cases into established legal frameworks (*takyīf*), and the verification that a concrete case meets the precise conditions for applying of a ruling (*taḥqīq al-manāṭ*). Al-Syāṭibī explains *taḥqīq al-manāṭ* as the ongoing ijtihad required even after a ruling has been established through textual evidence, since its application to a specific context must still be examined.[10] Shubayr requires that *takyīf* be accompanied by verification of genuine

Hasyim, "Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2020): 21–35, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13.

[9] Cheong, "Authority", 95.

[10] Ibrāhīm bin Mūsā al-Syāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Syarīʿah,* vol. 4 (Cairo: Dār Ibn 'Affān, 1997), 74–75 .

equivalence between the novel case and its legal precedent.[11] The third tier is the decree or fatwa itself. Masud, Messick, and Powers position the fatwa as the juncture where the text meets the petitioner's circumstance,[12] rendering the second tier the precise site where this negotiation occurs. This three-tiered model serves as an analytical tool: for each post, this article notes the presence, absence, or concealment of each tier, alongside the specific *uṣūl* mechanisms cited or identifiable from the ruling.

Scriptural compression is defined as the reduction of visible evidence and analytical layers within a single post relative to its source material. This concept distinguishes three operationally distinct actions performed by different actors: the editing of live broadcasts into short clips (platform formatting); the deferral of detailed explanations to secondary channels, such as YouTube links (distribution strategy); and the non-uploading of assembly background papers (institutional publication policy). Compression is operationalized by measuring the presence or absence of *naṣṣ*, chain-of-transmission evaluation (*naqd al-sanad*), scholarly citations, and explicit statements of legal reasoning in each post (see Appendix 1). Digital *iḥtiyāṭ* (precaution) is restricted to measures of precaution and *sadd al-żarīʿah* (blocking the means) justified specifically by platform dynamics—such as uncontrolled circulation, ad algorithms, and image permanence; standard precautionary measures in ritual worship that are merely broadcast via screens are excluded. From a media studies perspective, mediatization is understood as the adaptation of religious institutions to media logic,[13] operationalized here as format selection. Social media logic is analyzed through the four dimensions formulated by van Dijck and Poell: programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication.[14] Platform performativity is employed not in Austin's speech-act sense or Butler's gender theory, but to denote how authority is displayed through visible, quantifiable markers within the user interface, such as labels, titles, caption placement, and engagement metrics.

Uṣūl al-fiqh is employed in two clearly defined modes. In the descriptive mode, *uṣūl* terminology functions as object vocabulary: the Fatwa Council itself uses terms such as *takyīf*, *tarjīḥ*, original permissibility (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*), and precaution, allowing the analysis to

[11] Muḥammad ʿUśmān Syubayr, *al-Takyīf al-Fiqhī li al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Mustajaddah wa Taṭbīqātuh al-Fiqhiyyah* (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2004), 30.

[12] Masud, Messick, and Powers, "Muftis, Fatwas", 3.

[13] Stig Hjarvard, "The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change," *Northern Lights* 6, no. 1 (2008): 9–26, https://doi.org/10.1386/nl.6.1.9_1, 11.

[14] José van Dijck and Thomas Poell, "Understanding Social Media Logic," *Media and Communication* 1, no. 1 (2013): 2–14, https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v1i1.70, 5–9.

document these deployed mechanisms without assessing their validity. In the normative mode, the analysis conducts internal critique by evaluating the application of these mechanisms against the criteria established by the *uṣūl* tradition—such as the requirement of genuine equivalence in *takyīf* or the jurisdictional limits of *ḥukm al-ḥākim* in resolving scholarly disagreements. Every normative evaluation in this article is explicitly identified as such. Both modes intersect with media analysis through a unifying question: among the mechanisms emploted by the institution, which remain visible after the fatwa is packaged for Instagram, and which can only be inferred by the reader? Because internal assembly papers and full broadcast recordings were not directly analyzed, the term "invisible" or "absent" in this article strictly denote non-publication within the post, rather than non-execution by the institution.

Method

The material object of this research consists of fatwas issued by the Fatwa Council of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad and disseminated on Instagram through collaborative posts between @dewanfatwapa and @fatwatv. This case is treated as an instrumental case study—examined not for its own sake but to illuminate broader dynamics regarding the intersection of *istinbāṭ* and platform logic.[15] Its significance rests on three factors. First, the Fatwa Council represents the collective fatwa body of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad. Al-Irsyad originated as an early 20th-century reformist movement influenced by early Salafism,[16] whereas Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad was established in 2007 by a faction aligned with contemporary Salafi daʿwah following an internal schism, while another faction remained as Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah.[17] Consequently, this institution enables the study of institutionalized textualism without assuming uniformity across the broader Al-Irsyad movement. Second, the institution circulates fatwas in three distinct formats—assembly press releases, Q&A broadcast clips, and text carousels—allowing format-driven effects to be compared within a single organization. Third, the collaboration feature renders every fatwa a networked media product.

[15] Robert E. Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1995), 3.

[16] Amal Fathullah Zarkasyi, "Ta'sīr al-Ḥarakah al-Salafiyyah bi-Miṣr 'alā al-Mujaddidīn bi-Indūnīsiyā fī Taṭwīr al-Tarbiyah al-Islāmiyyah," *Studia Islamika* 20, no. 2 (2013): 275–323, 275.

[17] Miftahuddin and Ajat Sudrajat, "Identity Crisis, Contestation, and Conflict within the Hadrami Community of Al-Irsyad 1990–2007," *Journal of Social Studies* 13, no. 1 (2017): 53–62, https://doi.org/10.21831/jss.v13i1.16973 .

Posts were purposively[18] selected based on two inclusion criteria: the post must contain a formal legal ruling responding to a specific query, and it must have been distributed through co-authorship between both accounts. Promotional posts, announcements, and lectures lacking a ruling were excluded. Sampling aimed to achieve variance across formats, mufti types, and thematic domains. The final corpus comprises fourteen posts covering thirteen distinct fatwas: six Q&A clips (August–October 2026), six press releases from the 13th Assembly held on August 4, 2025 (including one re-upload of the donation funds fatwa), and two text carousels (June and September 2025). The time lag between press releases and clips reflects the production timelines of each channel: press releases are tied to assembly schedules, whereas clips originate from ongoing broadcast programming. The re-uploaded post was retained as a distinct unit of circulation due to its unique caption, metrics, and comment thread, though it was counted as a single fatwa in the content analysis. The distribution of the corpus by topic, format, mufti, query type, and ruling direction is presented in Appendix 1. This corpus is not intended to represent the entirety of the institution's fatwas.

This study employs a qualitative design with a case study approach, as the fatwas and the platforms circulating them represent contemporary phenomena whose boundaries with their context are not clearly defined.[19] This approach is combined with non-participatory netnography, which involves observing pre-existing online interactions without researcher intervention.[20] Primary data sources include video files, captions, carousel slides, follower comments, and engagement metric screenshots; secondary sources comprise classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* texts and literature on media and religious authority. All posts and corresponding screenshots were archived on October 12–13, 2026. Video narratives were transcribed from embedded subtitles, cross-checked with audio tracks, and timestamped. Out of approximately 243 comments recorded on the platform counter, 196 comments (141 top-level comments and 55 replies) were successfully archived; the discrepancy accounts for comments restricted or unrendered by the user interface. The analysis follows directed content analysis, utilizing theoretical concepts as initial coding

[18] Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks : SAGE, 2002), 230.

[19] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*, 6th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2018), 15.

[20] Leesa Costello, Marie-Louise McDermott, and Ruth Wallace, "Netnography: Range of Practices, Misperceptions, and Missed Opportunities," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 16, no. 1 (2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406917700647 .

categories while explicitly reporting of non-conforming data.[21] The analysis progressed through four stages: First, each fatwa was coded by topic, format, mufti, question type, evidence, *uṣūl* mechanism, and ruling direction. Second, mechanisms were analyzed through descriptive and normative modes as outlined in the conceptual framework. Third, format and circulation were evaluated against elements of social media logic. Fourth, matrix results per post were integrated and tested through paired comparisons controlling for format and mufti type, alongside comment coding that tracked the analytical operations performed by followers (Appendix 2). Coding was executed by the author and cross-verified across all comments; non-conforming instances were reported and used to refine the final findings.

All posts originated from public institutional accounts, and the featured scholars spoke in a public capacity; therefore, institutional and speaker names were not anonymized. In contrast, commenting followers were treated as private individuals. Their account names were omitted, each comment was assigned an anonymous code (e.g., K-BPJS-15 for the 15th comment on the BPJS post), and the contents was paraphrased to prevent traceability via search engines. The coded comment archive is retained by the author and can be made available to editors or reviewers for verification purposes. This research involved no direct interaction with users and relied solely on publicly accessible data at the time of archiving.

Procedural Legitimacy and Public Order Accommodation: Scriptural Abstraction, Contractual *Takyīf*, and Positive Law

This subsection examines five fatwas addressing the state and formal institutions: BPJS Kesehatan (national health insurance), the operational use of donation funds, the sale of *furoda* (non-quota) hajj packages, leftover Free Nutritious Meals (MBG), and the storage of sacrificial meat by charitable foundations. Four of these pertain to domains governed by the default legal presumption of original permissibility (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*); thus, the absence of explicit *naṣṣ* establishing permissibility is not an anomaly but a standard feature of Islamic jurisprudence.[22] The central inquiry, therefore, is not whether *naṣṣ* is cited but which analytical mechanisms are deployed to manage the risks inherent in these schemes and how those mechanisms are presented. Three mechanisms predominate: procedural

[21] Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis," *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (2005): 1277–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687 .

[22] Aḥmad bin 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmū' al-Fatāwā,* vol. 29 (Medina: Mujamma' al-Malik Fahd, 1995), 132 .

formulas replacing textual derivations, contractual *takyīf* categorizing novel schemes into established legal types, and references to positive law as corroborative premises. For an institution aligned with contemporary Salafism—which emphasizes direct reliance on the Qur'an and Sunnah[23]—this combination warrants close examination, as the legitimacy of these rulings rests far more on procedure and classification than on explicit scriptural texts.

In the 13th Assembly press releases, *mu'amalah* (transactional law) rulings are introduced with a uniform formula: "after assembling and deliberating in light of textual evidence, scholarly opinions, and fatwas circulating across official and unofficial institutions."[24] This formula asserts that evidentiary weighing has taken place without revealing its internal processes. The source of legitimacy presented is the forum itself: the BPJS ruling concludes by claiming consensus as a decision "established by all members of the Fatwa Council without exception."[25] Within the council's internal vocabulary, this constitutes a claim of collective ijtihad (*ijtihād jamāʿī*), rather than a substitute for *istinbāṭ*. Therefore, this article thus interprets the formula as a procedural presentation of *istinbāṭ*, rather than evidence of its absence. Followers' responses to this framing vary. Of the 37 comments on the BPJS post, 19 express gratitude and prayers; several followers express relief at using BPJS, and one defends the ruling as valid ijtihad on a disputed matter. Four other comments contest the ruling or request downloadable documentation.[26] Another follower cites contemporary *mu'amalah* jurisprudence literature to support permissibility, illustrating that a segment of the audience independently seeks the unpublished evidence.[27]

Behind this procedural framework, the permissibility of all five fatwas is established through distinct analytical mechanisms. Table 1 outlines the source, format, presence of *naṣṣ*, requirements of default legal rules, analytical mechanisms, institutional premises, and ruling directions for each case.

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[23] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004 .

[24] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" ; Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Hukum Menggunakan Dana Donasi untuk Biaya Operasional," Instagram Video, August 12, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/reel/DNO5tBbTVvI/; Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Hukum Menjual Paket Haji Furoda," Instagram Video, August 15, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/reel/DNWqSjGz44p/.

[25] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[26] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[27] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan".

Table 1. Deployment of Scriptural Evidence in State and Institutional Fatwas

Issue (Subject; Format)	Explicit *Naṣṣ*	Analytical Mechanism	Institutional Premise	Ruling Direction
BPJS Kesehatan (State; Press release)	None	*Takyīf*: *ta'āwunī* (mutual aid) insurance, "not commercial insurance"	State program; contributions managed by state and "benefits belong to the state"	Permissible across five decrees, including Decree 5: state may "manage contributions collected from participants for profit"
Operational Use of Donation Funds (Private foundation; Press release)	None	Categorization based on donor conditions, followed by *tarjīḥ* (preponderance)	"In line with positive law in Indonesia"	Impermissible if donor explicitly conditions usage; permissible if donations are unrestricted, conditional on fairness, trust, transparency, and proportionality
Furoda Hajj Packages (Private agencies & pilgrims; Press release)	None	*Takyīf*: split into *ju'ālah* (visa processing) and travel services; *gharar* (uncertainty) as threshold	Official Saudi hajj visa, legal status of specialized operators, regular quota limits	Permissible despite higher cost; impermissible if costs or services are ambiguous, or if visa, legality, or quota manipulation occurs
Leftover Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) (State program; Teachers; Clip)	None	Default permissibility ("in the absence of prohibition") and avoiding waste (*mubażżir*) [00:33–00:41]	State knowledge as implicit permission: "government authorities are fully aware" [00:41–00:47]; caterers "will not accept" returns [01:35–01:39]	Permissible for teachers to consume or distribute to those in need
Storage of Sacrificial Meat by Foundations	(HR. al-Bukhārī and Muslim)	General *naṣṣ* broadened; one-third distribution	Foundation positioned as trustee (*amīn*)	Permissible provided it does not deprive those with greater need

(Private foundation; Carousel)	"not mandatory as no explicit naṣṣ regulates it"

Note: Timestamps refer to the uploaded video files; full sources details are provided in Appendix 1.

Table 1 demonstrates that four out of five fatwas omit *naṣṣ*, and in all four cases, default rules do not strictly require it. A more informative distinction lies in format: the sole fatwa citing a hadith is presented as a text carousel, whereas assembly press releases omit explicit *naṣṣ*, even in rulings addressing personal choices (see the subsequent subsection). The ruling directions across all five cases are determined by *takyīf* and institutional premises. Classifying BPJS as *ta'āwunī* insurance removes it from commercial insurance categories plagued by *gharar* (risk), *maysir* (gambling), and *ribā* (usury), thereby permitting the state to manage contributions for profit.[28] One commenter challenged this distinction, noting that commercial insurance firms similarly manage premiums for profit to cover participant claims.[29]

The council's position also diverges from the 2015 Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) Fatwa Commission Assembly, which declared BPJS non-compliant with sharia, and from DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 98/2015, which subsequently established sharia health insurance guidelines.[30] The Fatwa Council did not demand a distinct sharia scheme, but reclassified the existing state program. In the *furoda* case, impermissibility is anchored in cost ambiguity, service obscurity, and visa or quota manipulation.[31] Even without invoking positive law, most of these boundaries derive from classic prohibitions against *gharar* and *tadlīs* (deception); positive law functions here as a practical marker of violation rather than the sole legal basis. In the MBG meal case, permissibility rests on *ibāḥah aṣlīyah* reinforced by government awareness interpreted as implicit consent; the institutional premise does not alter the legal status but confirms that third-party rights remain uninfringed.[32] In the sacrificial meat case, the absence of explicit scripture regulating distribution ratios is

[28] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[29] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[30] Majelis Ulama Indonesia, "Ijtima' Ulama Komisi Fatwa se-Indonesia V tentang Masalah-Masalah Fiqih Kontemporer (*Masail Fiqhiyah Mu'ashirah*)" (Jakarta, 2015); Dewan Syariah Nasional–Majelis Ulama Indonesia, *Fatwa Nomor 98/DSN-MUI/XII/2015 tentang Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan Syariah* (Jakarta: DSN-MUI, 2015).

[31] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menjual Paket Haji Furoda".

[32] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Apakah Haram Jika Guru Memakan Sisa Jatah MBG Siswa yang Tidak Hadir?," Instagram Video, October 5, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/DeG3xVzp7db/ .

interpreted as operational latitude for charitable foundations.[33] This aligns with scholarly opinions holding that one-third distribution is non-mandatory, thus remaining within scriptural bounds. Notably, the analytical direction systematically expands organizational discretion.

Beyond issuing normative *halāl* (permissible) or *harām* (forbidden) verdicts, these rulings include provisions that resemble regulatory language: permissions, obligations, and recommendations directed at the state, institutions, commercial actors, and individual pilgrims (see Table 2). While recommendations are common in institutional fatwas, the specificity here is notable, extending directly into internal operational governance.

Table 2. Addressees and Types of Provision in Fatwa Rulings

Fatwa	Addressee	Provision Type or Recommendation	Function (Author's Interpretation)
BPJS Kesehatan	State	Permitted to manage participant contributions for profit (Decree 5)	Legitimation of state policy
BPJS Kesehatan	Institutions, companies, employees, independent participants	Permitted to enroll and receive benefits (Decrees 1–4)	Authorization of public participation
Use of Donation Funds	Foundations and executive boards	Seek alternative revenue (endowments, specific donations), practice frugality, prioritize direct-execution donors, cap administrative overhead via board decision rather than staff discretion	Internal institutional governance
Use of Donation Funds	Donors and fundraisers	Donors encouraged to give unrestricted funds; fundraisers requested to avoid restricting donations	Contractual engineering expanding operational flexibility
Furoda Hajj Packages	Travel agencies	Unbundle contracts, fix clear and binding costs, offer money-back guarantees, eliminate visa, legal, and quota manipulation	Business compliance standards

[33] Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Hukum Menyimpan Daging Kurban untuk Kebutuhan Warga ataupun Yayasan," Instagram Carousel, June 2, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/p/DKYEvlBhYPj/.

Furoda Hajj Pilgrims Packages	Hajj remains valid regardless of visa type; sinful if aware of and consenting to fraud; entitled to financial compensation	Consumer protection; separation of ritual validity from personal sin

Note: The "Function" column reflects the author's analytical interpretation and does not represent explicit fatwa text.

As shown in Table 2, governance vocabulary permeates the rulings through terms such as "mandatory frugality," "money-back guarantee," and "right to compensation." Two analytical patterns emerge. First, in the *furoda* fatwa, practical liability for visa manipulation is primarily shifted primarily onto travel agencies, while the spiritual validity (*ṣiḥḥah*) of the pilgrimage remains intact regardless of visa irregularities.[34] Distinguishing ritual validity from personal sin (*iṡm*) is a classical jurisprudential distinction, and the fatwa explicitly maintains the sinfulness of pilgrims who knowingly consent to fraud.

What is distinctive is the operational emphasis: practical compliance burdens are placed on commercial operators. Second, in the donation funds fatwa, the council goes beyond evaluating existing contracts to actively guide donors toward making unrestricted gifts while directing fundraisers to avoid restrictive terms.[35] This constitutes contractual engineering: reshaping future transactional structures to broaden institutional operational latitude. Unlike behavioral recommendations, contractual engineering alters the underlying legal categorization of the transaction itself. In the comment section, followers frequently treat this regulatory voice as a reference for public policy, raising follow-up queries regarding fines, back payments, and taxes.[36] Conversely, another commenter lamented that such broad permissibility renders everything halal to suit contemporary trends, a claim immediately contested by fellow users.[37]

In a normative framework, the permissibility of these three *muʿāmalah* schemes can be evaluated against the *uṣūl* framework asserted by the institution. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the burden of proof in *muʿāmalah* lies in establishing impermissibility, not permissibility; thus, the absence of explicit *naṣṣ* in permissive rulings is methodologically

[34] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menjual Paket Haji Furoda".

[35] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menggunakan Dana Donasi untuk Biaya Operasional".

[36] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[37] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

justifiable.[38] Permissibility is constructed through *takyīf*: BPJS is categorized as *taʿāwunī*, while *furoda* packages are unbundled into *juʿālah* (commission) and service contracts. Shubayr requires that *takyīf* include verification of genuine equivalence between the novel case and its legal precedent,[39] a step that al-Syāṭibī incorporates within *taḥqīq al-manāṭ*.[40] This verification is absent in the posts. Because background assembly papers were not published, this study cannot determine whether verification occurred internally; what can be stated is that readers of the posts lack the material to independently verify it. A more pronounced methodological tension arises in the donation fatwa, where the endorsed opinion is justified as being "in line with positive law."[41] Al-Qarāfī restricts the authority of the ruler's power (*ḥukm al-ḥākim*) to resolve scholarly disputes exclusively to judicial decrees in ijtihad-based cases, not general statutory legislation.[42] However, the Salafi milieu aligned with this institution treats obedience to the ruler (*walī al-amr*) as a core doctrinal principle, thereby granting state regulations significant weight in jurisprudential balancing (*tarjīḥ*).[43] Positioning positive law as a corroborative preference (*murajjiḥ*) is thus more accurately understood as adopting a specific, debated *uṣūl* position rather than a raw departure from jurisprudence. The valid critique is that this methodological choice is neither declared nor argued within the public rulings.

These *uṣūl* choices were made prior to posting; thus, their permissive nature was not created by Instagram. Instead, the platform's formatting shaped was how that permissibility was publicly presented. Within a mediatization framework, this adaptation is evident in the council's decision to circulate rulings as video reels featuring numbered decrees, while relegating paper titles to captions.[44] Through this format, the institution implicitly treats its audience as laypersons (*ʿāmmī*). Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ justifies a mufti withholding non-definitive (*ghaīr qaṭʿī*) evidence from lay petitioners,[45] whereas Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah urges muftis to cite evidence and legal sources whenever possible

[38] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā*, 29:132.

[39] Shubayr, *al-Takyīf al-Fiqhī*, 30.

[40] al-Syāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt*, 4:74–75.

[41] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menggunakan Dana Donasi untuk Biaya Operasional".

[42] Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, *Anwār al-Burūq fī Anwāʾ al-Furūq,* vol. 2 (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, n.d.), 103 .

[43] Sunarwoto, "Negotiating Salafī Islam".

[44] Hjarvard, "Mediatization of Religion", 11; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[45] ʿUśmān ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī* (Medina: Maktabat al-ʿUlūm wa al-Ḥikam, 1986), 171.

rather than delivering bare legal verdicts.[46] A minority of followers demand the latter standard, requesting downloadable texts and challenging the *taʿāwunī* classification.[47] Tyler defines legitimacy as the belief that an authority is appropriate, proper, and just, warranting voluntary compliance.[48] Comment data indicate that this belief holds among most followers, though it does not eliminate transparency demands from a critical minority. Platform logic does not alter internal *istinbāṭ* but provides an interface where presentation gaps are openly interrogated.

From these patterns, an interpretative hypothesis emerges. The fatwas provide religious legitimation for state and institutional initiatives, while the council gains institutional authority by emulating official state bodies; organizations that resemble legitimate institutional structures tend to be perceived as legitimate themselves.[49] This resemblance is particularly evident in press release reels, which feature numbered sessions, designated spokespersons, and bulleted decrees disseminated across networked accounts. Bunt observes that cyber Islamic environments do not replace conventional structures but extend them beyond physical institutional boundaries.[50] Session reels preserve formal institutional aesthetics while projecting them into the digital public sphere. The hypothesis posits that state-level accommodation and individual-level precaution are structurally linked: matters of public order are delegated to state authority, aligning with purist Salafi doctrine,[51] while the council retains primary disciplinary authority over personal lifestyle choices. Although this hypothesis cannot be confirmed through institutional intent, it can be tested against the distribution of rulings. The following subsection demonstrates that this distribution is not entirely clear-cut, as certain fatwas addressing individuals also yield permissive outcomes.

These findings add nuance to two streams of literature. Studies on Salafism and the state have examined state accommodation as doctrine—such as institutionalizing

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[46] Muḥammad bin Abī Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, *I'lām al-Muwaqqi'īn 'an Rabb al-'Ālamīn,* vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1991), 174 .

[47] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[48] Tom R. Tyler, "Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation," *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 (2006): 375–400, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038 .

[49] Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 2 (1983): 147–60, https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101 .

[50] Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 11.

[51] Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy", 217–19.

obedience to *walī al-amr* among Madkhali Salafism groups[52]—and as the alignment of piety with civic participation.[53] The Fatwa Council case reveals a more granular dimension: accommodation also operates directly through specific *istinbāṭ* tools—namely, *takyīf* and the deployment of positive law as *murajjiḥ*. Literature on digital authority emphasizes institutional erosion driven by visual preachers,[54] cyber-resistance to traditional hierarchies,[55] the dominance of individual channels,[56] and the eclipse of official fatwas by viral trends.[57] This case serves as a comparative counterpoint: at the ruling level, the council preserves institutional authority by replicating formal procedural aesthetics. However, as discussed in the third subsection, authority over practical application remains dispersed across comment sections and individual scholarly figures. These dynamics operate on different analytical layers and are not mutually exclusive. Where traditionalist organizations lean on individual charisma and modernists on written bureaucracy on Instagram,[58] the Fatwa Council bridges both by co-authoring posts across institutional and personal scholar accounts.

Textual Restriction and Piety Purification: Scriptural Explication, Chain Critique, and Digital *Iḥtiyāṭ*

This subsection examines fatwas addressing individuals—specifically concerning ritual worship (*'ibādah*), personal finances, and self-presentation on social media. The foundational jurisprudential framework referenced by the council explicitly distinguishes worship, which is prescriptive (*tauqīfī*), from custom (*'ādah*), which carries the default legal presumption of original permissibility (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*).[59] Under this distinction, the presence of explicit texts and chain-of-transmission critique (*naqd al-sanad*) in worship fatwas is an

[52] Sunarwoto, "Negotiating Salafī Islam".

[53] Chaplin, "Salafi Islamic Piety".

[54] Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa".

[55] Gary R. Bunt, "#Islam, Social Networking and the Cloud," in *Islam in the Modern World*, ed. Jeffrey T. Kenney and Ebrahim Moosa (London: Routledge, 2014).

[56] Wahyudi Akmaliah, "The Demise of Moderate Islam: New Media, Contestation, and Reclaiming Religious Authorities," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 1 (2020): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.1-24.

[57] Zuhri et al., "Transforming Religious Authority".

[58] Rika Lusri Virga, "Fatwas and Figures: How NU and Muhammadiyah Shape Religious Authority on Indonesian Instagram Accounts," *Jurnal Sosiologi Reflektif* 19, no. 2 (2025): 259–88, https://doi.org/10.14421/j4wpwh96.

[59] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmū' al-Fatāwā*, 29:16–17 .

expected requirement of legal theory rather than evidence of asymmetry. The analysis therefore separates these fatwas into two categories. The first comprises worship fatwas that display *naṣṣ* and evaluate Hadith authenticity, where the analytical focus centers on what is affirmed versus what is restricted. The second comprises fatwas addressing customary matters (*ʿādah*)—such as YouTube AdSense revenue and selfies—which should theoretically lean toward permissibility. It is within this second category that precaution (*iḥtiyāṭ*) and blocking the means (*sadd al-żarīʿah*) operate, providing the precise baseline to test asymmetry against the findings of the first subsection.

In worship fatwas, the *naṣṣ* is explicitly cited, and the authenticity of the chain of transmission is evaluated transparently. However, this textual presence is partially influenced by the type of question posed: the *Kaffaratul Majelis* (assembly closing prayer) fatwa contains the most detailed chain critique because the query specifically inquired about Hadith grading.[60] Therefore, the query type is thus recorded as a variable across the corpus (see Appendix 1). Table 3 maps the evidence presented, analytical operations performed, restricted practices, and affirmed positions.

Table 3. Deployment of Scriptural Evidence in Ritual Worship Fatwas

Fatwa (Format; Mufti)	Displayed Evidence	Operational Handling of Evidence	Restricted Practice	Affirmed/ Permitted Position
Kaffaratul Majelis Hadith Grading (Press release; Collective)	Closing prayer Hadiths across multiple companion chains	All chains traced; weak chains evaluated as mutually reinforcing to *ḥasan* (good), with one chain (al-Sāʾib ibn Yazīd) declared flawless; authenticating vs. weakening scholars mapped; al-Ḥākim's citation of al-Bukhārī corrected	Practicing alternative closing prayers ("not practicing others")	*Kaffaratul majelis* prayer affirmed as an established sunnah to be recited at assembly endings
QS. Yāsīn Recitation (Carousel;	"Yāsīn is the heart of the Qur'an"; "Whosoever	Yāsīn virtue Hadiths declared weak and fabricated (*mawḍūʿ*) citing Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Mawḍūʿāt*;	Believing in specific virtues of Yāsīn	Reciting Yāsīn declared "not wrong"; encouraging

[60] Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Derajat Hadits Do'a Kaffaratul Majelis," Instagram Video, August 13, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/reel/DNReBOCzNUU/.

Individual scholar)	recites Yāsīn at night is forgiven"; Khubaib Hadith on QS. al-Ikhlāṣ, QS. al-Falaq, and QS. al-Nās	short surah Hadiths offered as possessing "authentic virtues"	without authentic evidence ("feared to be erroneous")	Qur'anic learning and reciting any surah affirmed as worship; learners directed to short surahs
Praying in Salat Using Indonesian (Clip; Individual scholar)	Hadith on the servant's closeness to the Lord during prostration	Scope generality acknowledged ("some state it is general") and permissive scholar opinions cited; both overridden by "greater precaution"	Reciting non-Arabic supplications inside ritual prayer	Indonesian prayers shifted outside salat; Arabic supplications during prostration encouraged

Table 3 indicates that the label "restriction" applies only to specific components of the rulings. In *Kaffaratul Majelis*, chain critique actually elevated weak Hadiths to *ḥasan* status, affirming the practice while limiting its expansion into unevidenced supplications.[61] In the Yāsīn fatwa, reciting the surah was declared intrinsically unobjectionable; the restriction was confined to unauthentic beliefs regarding specific virtues.[62] Only in the prostration prayer fatwa was textual generality (*ʿām*) overridden by precaution, encouraging the displacement of Indonesian supplications to outside the salat.[63] This move aligns with the classical legal maxim urging avoidance of scholarly disagreement (*al-khurūj min al-khilāf*).[64] Thus, the trajectory across these three fatwas is not an arbitrary narrowing of worship but a shift away from unevidenced customs toward authentic scriptural foundations. Displaying intricate chain corrections on Instagram also serves to demonstrate the institution's scholarly competence (*scholarly authority performance*) before a digital audience. Follower responses were divided. On the prostration prayer post, several users adopted the precautionary logic—noting they had memorized short Arabic supplications—

[61] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Derajat Hadits Do'a Kaffaratul Majelis".

[62] Dewan Fatwa PA [@dewanfatwapa], "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?," Instagram Carousel, September 25, 2025, https://www.instagram.com/dewanfatwapa/p/DPAMfd1k1jV/.

[63] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Bolehkah Berdoa dalam Shalat Menggunakan Bahasa Indonesia?," Instagram Video, September 18, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/DdbBTpzJqAN/.

[64] 'Abd al-Wahhāb bin 'Alī al-Subkī, *al-Asybāh wa al-Naẓā'ir,* vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1991), 111.

while others inquired whether silent mental prayers or direct Qur'anic verses were permissible.[65] On the Yāsīn post, one comment interpreted the fatwa as evidence that Al-Irsyad's leadership had been usurped by a group he labeled "Wahhabi."[66]

The second category reveals a markedly different trajectory. In the AdSense fatwa, YouTube revenue was declared impermissible "regardless of the content created," encompassing educational and preaching channels. The rationale was not based on content quality but on the creator's inability to filter incoming advertisements, as YouTube serves ads algorithmically based on viewer habits.[67] This fatwa omitted explicit *naṣṣ*; impermissibility was constructed via *sadd al-dharīʿah* against uncontrolled ad streams. This position diverges from the 8th Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) Fatwa Commission Assembly (2024), which treats digital creator income as subject to zakat, provided the content itself does not violate sharia.[68]

In the selfie fatwa, the council initially departed from default permissibility: photography is disputed among contemporary scholars, with the stronger opinion permitting it "because the default rule of things is permissibility (*al-ibāḥah*)."[69] This permissibility was subsequently narrowed. Selfies are permitted for private necessity provided modesty (*ʿawrah*) is maintained, publication is avoided, and ostentation is absent; they become impermissible when accompanied by adornment (*tabarruj*) and public distribution triggering temptation (*fitnah*), performed during worship for show (*riyāʾ*), or entailing physical hazard. Recommendations urge Muslim women to avoid selfies absent clear religious necessity, refrain from uploading them to social media, and request the public to withhold likes from such content.[70] This burden was gendered, targeting women specifically and extending to female child-rearing practices. The umrah fatwa involving usurious income operated via another distinction: the pilgrimage itself may be structurally valid (*ṣaḥīḥ*), but spiritual reward (*thawāb*) remains compromised, directing followers

[65] Fatwa TV, "Bolehkah Berdoa dalam Shalat Menggunakan Bahasa Indonesia?" .

[66] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?" .

[67] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Apa Hukum Penghasilan dari YouTube AdSense?," Instagram Video, October 3, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/DeB49rApzun/ .

[68] Majelis Ulama Indonesia [@muipusat], "Penghasilan dari YouTube, Instagram, dan TikTok Makin Besar, tapi Apakah Wajib Dizakati?," Instagram Video, October 12, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/muipusat/reel/Dea29rcP6v6/.

[69] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie" .

[70] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie" .

toward sharia-compliant financial institutions.[71] The first two cases fulfill the operational definition of digital *iḥtiyāṭ* because their legal rationales are tied to platform characteristics—namely, advertising algorithms and image circulation—whereas the third case does not.

Two other fatwas addressing personal conduct yielded permissive outcomes. In the case of the dawn *qunūt*, congregants were advised to follow an imam who recites qunut, citing al-ʿUthaymīn and the Hadith, "The imam is appointed to be followed."[72] In the case of bowing as a gesture of respect, a Hadith in al-Tirmiżī—graded as good by some scholars—was invoked to prohibit the act; yet slight bowing, habitual to local etiquette (*'urf*), was explicitly cleared of being polytheism (*syirk*).[73] These two cases cannot be subsumed under a simplistic "strict toward individuals" formula. They demonstrate that the primary dividing line in this corpus is not strictly between institutions and individuals, but between collective order and personal choice. Permissibility is extended when matters touch public systems, congregational unity, or social custom; precaution is heightened when matters concern core dogma, prayer language, income sources, and personal self-presentation—domains fully within individual control. This formulation must be interpreted carefully, as congregants following an imam in disputed ijtihad matters is a long-standing jurisprudential position, including within the cited Salafi sources; the *qunūt* case does not represent a platform-specific shift. This permissibility was similarly contested from two directions. Some followers rejected it by citing alternative scholars who prohibit following *qunūt* and argued that obedience to the imam is conditional (*muqayyad*),[74] while others dismissed it as mixed-and-matched jurisprudence (*fikih campur aduk*).[75] Regarding the bowing post, several users defended bowing as traditional Javanese etiquette, while another deemed the scholar's answer overly harsh.[76]

The formulation of collective order versus personal choice was evaluated through three paired comparisons. The first comparison controlled for format and mufti type: the BPJS and selfie fatwas were both 13th Assembly press releases, both collective decisions,

[71] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Sering Umrah tapi Dibiayai dari Penghasilan Riba," Instagram Video, September 29, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/Dd3VD_7pidD/ .

[72] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?".

[73] Fatwa TV [@fatwatv], "Apa Hukum Membungkukkan Badan sebagai Simbol Penghormatan?," Instagram Video, August 13, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/fatwatv/reel/Db9zayfyz6L/ .

[74] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[75] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[76] Fatwa TV, "Apa Hukum Membungkukkan Badan sebagai Simbol Penghormatan?" .

both omitted *naṣṣ*, and both originated from default permissibility. The divergence lay in risk management. In BPJS, risks of *gharar*, *maysir*, and usury were neutralized through *takyīf*, extending to allow state profit-seeking; in selfies, risks of *fitnah* and *riyā'* were amplified through restrictive conditions and recommendations. The second comparison controlled for risk structure: in both BPJS and AdSense, actors cannot control potentially problematic backend flows—namely, state fund management and algorithmic ad placement. In BPJS, this lack of control was not deemed fatal; in AdSense, it served as the core ratio legis (*'illah*) for impermissibility. This second comparison is methodologically weaker because format and mufti types differed, and AdSense income derives directly from ads, whereas BPJS benefits do not derive directly from investment returns. While this constitutes a valid jurisprudential distinction, it was unstated in the public fatwas. The third comparison, between two text carousels answered by individual scholars, demonstrated that format alone does not dictate ruling direction: in the sacrificial meat fatwa, the absence of detailed distribution scripture was interpreted as operational latitude, whereas in the Yāsīn fatwa, the absence of authentic virtue Hadiths was read as a strict boundary. This final difference is predicted by default legal rules and thus does not constitute asymmetry. Across all three comparisons, the defensible asymmetry resides in risk management within customary matters (*'ādah*): *sadd al-żarīʿah* functions as regulatory conditions on collective systems (e.g., *furoda* hajj compliance standards), but as prohibitions or restrictions on personal choices.

A similar division is evident in how the institution utilizes Instagram itself. The Social Shaping of Technology framework demonstrates that religious communities do not reject technology outright, but negotiate its adoption in alignment with their values and authority structures.[77] Within this context, three distinct groups of actors emerge. The institution uses video reels, carousels, and co-authored accounts as an official pulpit; male scholars appear in videos without scrutiny; while the visual self-presentation of laywomen is restricted through the selfie fatwa. Within the platform economy, algorithmic ad revenue is declared haram, whereas FatwaTV clip captions explicitly display donation bank accounts alongside call to actions to "Be part of the da'wah."[78] The dividing line is thus not an absolute *halāl* or *harām*, but rather who appears visually and how revenue is generated. Followers noticed this distinction: one user sarcastically remarked that the scholars

[77] Heidi Campbell, *When Religion Meets New Media* (London: Routledge, 2010), 50.

[78] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

themselves enjoy taking selfies, to which another follower immediately replied that the fatwa was directed at women, not male scholars.[79]

These patterns suggest an underlying model of religious subject formation. Purification is not employed to challenge broader societal practices but to cultivate individuals who self-regulate their beliefs, prayer language, sources of income, and visual presentation—aligning with purist Salafi strategies that operate through preaching and education.[80] The comment corpus offers preliminary evidence of this: several followers recounted personal habits they intended to modify, such as praying in Indonesian during prostration or memorizing short Arabic supplications, while others advised peers on navigating *qunūt* imams.[81] However, these indicators are insufficient to conclude that followers systematically monitor their own or others' piety. Therefore, this suggestion is presented as a hypothesis for future reception studies.

These findings add nuance to the literature on Salafi purification. Prior scholarship has framed purification as doctrinal contestation against local traditions,[82] identity formation establishing boundaries against non-Salafis,[83] or political accommodation accompanied by distance from the state.[84] In the Fatwa Council's output, boundaries are not drawn against the majority congregation: followers are advised to join qunut imams, and customary bowing is cleared of polytheism. Instead, the boundary is drawn instead around personal choice. Digital piety literature highlights individual anxiety over *riyāʾ* in online religious practice;[85] in the selfie fatwa, this anxiety is codified into formal legal rationale by an institutional body. Whereas the literature positions social media as an arena for young visual preachers that erodes institutional authority,[86] this case demonstrates that a fatwa council utilizes the same platform to establish boundaries for follower self-presentation, even as authority over the practical application of those boundaries remains actively negotiated in comment threads.

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[79] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie" .

[80] Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy", 217–19.

[81] Fatwa TV, "Bolehkah Berdoa dalam Shalat Menggunakan Bahasa Indonesia?" ; Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[82] Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism.*

[83] Chris Chaplin, "Communal Salafi Learning and Islamic Selfhood: Examining Religious Boundaries through Ethnographic Encounters in Indonesia," *Ethnography* 21, no. 1 (2020): 113–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138118795988.

[84] Sunarwoto, "Negotiating Salafī Islam".

[85] Husein and Slama, "Online Piety".

[86] Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Daʿwa"; Zuhri et al., "Transforming Religious Authority".

Scriptural Compression and Platform Performativity: Formats, Metrics, and Reasoning in the Comment Section

This subsection examines how both styles of fatwas are presented and circulated. Social media guides user behavior through interface design and rewards popularity via quantified metrics.[87] Short-form formats incentivize the production of fatwas as micro-content designed to be briefly viewed, shared, and counted. This pressure is not absolute, as the same platform also support long captions and multi-page carousels. Therefore, the analysis therefore focuses on the formats selected by the institution and the extent to which the scriptural and analytical layers are preserved within each format.

The reduction of scriptural evidence and reasoning layers in the Fatwa Council's posts occurs through three operationally distinct actions performed by different actors. Editing live Q&A broadcasts into short clips exemplifies platform formatting; for instance, the bowing clip begins mid-answer.[88] Deferring detailed explanations to secondary channels reflects a distribution choice; the Yāsīn and sacrificial meat carousels link full explanations to YouTube.[89] The non-uploading of assembly background papers represents an institutional publication policy; press release captions merely state the paper titles.[90] The space vacated by these three operations is filled with formal authority markers. Table 4 maps what is displayed, what is edited or deferred, and the corresponding authority markers for each format.

Table 4. Scriptural Compression Across Upload Formats

Format	Displayed Content on Instagram	Edited or Deferred Content (Operation & Actor)	Authority Markers
Q&A Broadcast Clips.	Oral answers, partially preceded by audience queries; Hadiths appear in 4 of 6 clips, cited without chains except "graded *ḥasan* by some scholars... narrated by al-Tirmiżī"; references to al-'Uṡaymīn	Full broadcast and petitioner's context (platform editing); bowing clip starts mid-answer	Scholar's name and title in first caption line; capitalized question headers; "Live Interactive" label; program titles

[87] van Dijck and Poell, "Understanding Social Media Logic", 5–7.

[88] Fatwa TV, "Apa Hukum Membungkukkan Badan sebagai Simbol Penghormatan?" .

[89] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?", caption; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menyimpan Daging Kurban untuk Kebutuhan Warga ataupun Yayasan" .

[90] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

Assembly Press Release Decrees	Procedural formulas, numbered decrees, and recommendations; *naṣṣ* absent except in *Kaffaratul Majelis* (query on Hadith grading)	Assembly papers and internal deliberation (institutional publication policy); caption states "Paper Title: ..."	"PRESS RELEASE" label, "13th Assembly" logo, branded cover sheets, claim of unanimous consensus
Text Carousels	Full query with petitioner's name and region; written response; Hadiths accompanied by grading and primary sources	Full oral response linked to YouTube (distribution choice)	"Answered by Ustadz Dr. ..., M.A."; large "FATWA" typography; website and WhatsApp contacts

Table 4 reveals a pattern that contradicts the assumption that the most formal format contains the highest density of evidence. Assembly press releases, which carry the greatest claim to institutional authority, cite *naṣṣ* least frequently, whereas simple text carousels include Hadith texts alongside authenticity assessments.[91] The exception found in the *Kaffaratul Majelis* press release suggests that the type of question also influences evidence density.[92] Since the platform and institution remain constant, this variation in evidence density is more accurately interpreted as a consequence of institutional format selection rather than platform constraints. Across all three formats, credential and institutional markers—such as doctoral titles, assembly logos, and program names—are prominently displayed in the primary visual field. In press releases, these markers function as performative compensation when scriptural evidence is omitted; however, identical markers also accompany text carousels containing full evidence, indicating that their role is better described as ubiquitous authority signifiers present across all formats. Followers interpret these presentation gaps in diverse ways: some raise follow-up technical questions about *qunūt* recitation protocols, others request formal fatwa texts, and some admonish peers to watch videos in their entirety before passing judgment.[93]

[91] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menggunakan Dana Donasi untuk Biaya Operasional"; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menjual Paket Haji Furoda"; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan"; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie"; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?"; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Menyimpan Daging Kurban untuk Kebutuhan Warga ataupun Yayasan".

[92] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Derajat Hadits Do'a Kaffaratul Majelis".

[93] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" ; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" ; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie" .

Fatwa circulation is further influenced by collaborative features, hashtag clusters, and calls to engagement. Posts within the corpus are co-authored by two to five accounts, including personal scholar profiles, thereby aggregating distinct follower bases into a unified audience (see Appendix 1). Hashtags are deployed not for individual fatwas but in standardized blocks. All 13th Assembly press releases include a master assembly hashtag block containing titles of unrelated papers, resulting in the selfie fatwa carrying tags such as #bpjskesehatan and #hajifuroda; both text carousels feature general da'wah hashtag blocks like #beraniberhijrah and #Menikah.[94] These standardized blocks enhance cross-topical visibility without requiring interpretation as post-specific strategies. Calls to engagement are framed in religious terms: captions on both text carousels describe liking, commenting, and sharing as "fields for ongoing charity (*ṣadaqah jāriyah*)," while FatwaTV clip captions encourage users to "spread goodness through likes, comments, and shares."[95] Metrics cannot be directly compared across accounts of different account scales and post ages without normalization; therefore, comparisons are limited to similar subgroups. Among press releases archived for approximately fourteen months, the selfie post (~1,800 likes) and BPJS post (~1,600 likes, 39 comments) generated the highest engagement, whereas *Kaffaratul Majelis*—containing the dense chain evaluation—recorded among the lowest (450 likes, 2 comments). Among FatwaTV clips, the *qunūt* clip garnered ~4,500 likes and 123 comments within five days, vastly surpassing older clips. In both groups, peak engagement corresponded to everyday practical dilemmas and identity markers rather than scriptural density.

Platform logic also generates ironies that are apparent from outside the fatwa's internal logic. For example, a fatwa urging the public to withhold likes from female selfies was circulated as a video of a male scholar that garnered substantial likes. This irony does not violate the fatwa's legal ratio legis (*'illah*), which is based on temptations arising from female visual imagery—a distinction explicitly noted by followers in the comments.[96] A more analytically significant tension appears in the AdSense fatwa. The ratio legis for impermissibility is the creator's inability to filter ads served algorithmically, and a commenter observed that YouTube displays ads regardless of whether a creator enables

[94] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie", caption; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?" .

[95] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Bagaimana Hukum Membaca Surat Yasin?", caption; Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[96] Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum Wanita Muslimah Berselfie" .

monetization.[97] Whether the institution's own YouTube content exists within that same ad ecosystem cannot be verified from this corpus, but this query marks a point where the legal rationale applied to individuals turns back upon the institution. Scriptural compression also creates space for competing references in comment threads, such as links to Almanhaj articles, alternative scholarly opinions, and external lecture videos.[98] Several followers directed follow-up queries directly to scholars' personal profiles rather than the institutional account.[99] Furthermore, 69 of the 196 comments (35 percent) consisted of repetitive expressions of gratitude and prayers across almost all posts. These indicators suggest that authority over the application of rulings increasingly adheres to individual scholar figures, even as authority over the rulings themselves remains with the institution.

Clip editing also intersects with the principle articulated by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah regarding the adaptation of fatwas according to changes in time, place, circumstance, intention, and custom.[100] For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, these five variables represent the specific context of the petitioner and their environment that a mufti must consider. Marwick and boyd analyze a related phenomenon from media studies: context collapse occurs when diverse audiences are flattened into a single group, making it difficult for the speaker to imagine their specific interlocutor.[101] The bridge between these frameworks is the position of the petitioner. In Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah's model, a concrete petitioner provides the basis for tailored rulings; in short clips, that specific petitioner is replaced by an imagined mass audience, while the response remains an answer to a single specific situation.

This analytical distinction is also critical: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah places the burden of contextual adaptation on the mufti, whereas context collapse is a structural condition that impinges upon the speaker. FatwaTV broadcasts were already mass broadcasts, meaning some petitioner context may have been lost prior to clip editing; because full broadcasts were not analyzed, the effect of clip editing cannot be entirely isolated from broadcast effects. In the *qunūt* case, the consequence manifests in comment threads: followers inquire whether they must follow *qunūt* in their local neighborhood mosque,

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[97] Fatwa TV, "Apa Hukum Penghasilan dari YouTube AdSense?" .

[98] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[99] Fatwa TV, "Bolehkah Berdoa dalam Shalat Menggunakan Bahasa Indonesia?" .

[100] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, 3:429 .

[101] Alice E. Marwick and danah boyd, "I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience," *New Media & Society* 13, no. 1 (2011): 114–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444810365313 .

while one commenter attempts to reconstruct the petitioner's context—arguing the ruling was intended for someone praying at a non-regular mosque.[102] Analytically, a context-specific answer circulates as a general rule, shifting the burden of contextual adaptation entirely onto the viewer.

Analyzed through van Dijck and Poell's four elements, programmability is evident in the strategic placement of scholar titles and question headers within the initial lines of captions; popularity is reflected in engagement metrics and calls to share; and connectivity is demonstrated through co-authored accounts.[103] Datafication operates differently within this institution. The corpus shows no evidence that engagement data is used to select ruling topics: 13th Assembly press releases present all assembly topics using identical formatting and hashtag blocks, regardless of engagement volume. At the ruling level, institutional assembly logic overrides platform logic. Platform logic exerts greater influence at the application level, where competing references and figures emerge in comment threads under the same post, presenting institutional authority alongside alternative sources that shape its reception.[104]

Across all three subsections, the transformation of the displayed structure of *istinbāṭ* on Instagram can be summarized as follows. The middle analytical layer—where *takyīf*, *taḥqīq al-manāṭ*, and contextual balancing operate—is absent in most posts. This omission occurs through distinct presentation styles. Fatwas addressing collective order appear as procedural authority: assembly formulas and numbered decrees replace scriptural derivations and reasoning. Worship fatwas addressing personal choice appear as textual authority: Hadiths and chain assessments are displayed, but the analytical reasoning connecting them to the petitioner's specific circumstances remains hidden. Customary fatwas addressing personal choice, such as those concerning AdSense and selfies, appear without explicit scripture or detailed reasoning. Because each post displays only one style, risk-handling asymmetry is invisible within a single post; it becomes apparent only when posts are collated—an operation performed partially by followers when calling fatwas "mixed-and-matched jurisprudence" or claiming that everything

[102] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" .

[103] van Dijck and Poell, "Understanding Social Media Logic", 5–9.

[104] Pauline Hope Cheong, "The Vitality of New Media and Religion: Communicative Perspectives, Practices, and Changing Authority in Spiritual Organization," *New Media & Society* 19, no. 1 (2017): 25–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816649913.

becomes *halāl* over time.[105] However, that middle analytical layer does not disappear entirely. Of the 196 archived comments, 46 percent performed analytical operations: applying rulings to personal situations, querying or introducing case variants, contesting rulings or demanding evidence, introducing competing evidence or authority, and answering fellow users. Sixty-eight of these occurred on the *qunūt* and BPJS posts; across most other posts, comments were dominated by expressions of gratitude (see Appendix 2). On the most active posts, a portion of the middle layer of *istinbāṭ* was executed by followers lacking formal ijtihad authority.

These findings add nuance to the literature on digital authority by emphasizing that platforms erode traditional institutional standing through viral short-form opinions and fragmented knowledge.[106] For the Fatwa Council, simplification arise not only from external platform dynamics but also from institutional format choices, and the reasoning that is not explicitly displayed is partially carried out by followers. From this, a comparative hypothesis can be proposed: the structural alignment between short formats and fatwa styles that exhibit direct leaps from text or procedure to ruling may partially explain why certain Salafi channels navigate social media with agility. This hypothesis requires comparative testing against channels from other legal traditions and platforms. For example, studies on Nahdlatul Ulama da'wah on TikTok demonstrate that short videos can be used to contextualize local wisdom.[107] Such cross-traditional and cross-platform comparisons are necessary before format alone can be claimed to dictate theological trajectories.

Conclusion

The characterization of Salafi fatwas as consistently textualist does not fully apply to the fatwas issued by the Fatwa Council of Perhimpunan Al-Irsyad, which circulate on Instagram. This article identifies an asymmetric *istinbāṭ* operating in a more specific form than initially hypothesized. The presence of explicit *naṣṣ* and chain critique primarily follows default legal rules, formats, and question types; therefore, the contrast between

[105] Fatwa TV, "Bagaimana Sikap Ketika Shalat Subuh Bersama Imam yang Membaca Qunut?" ; Dewan Fatwa PA, "Hukum BPJS Kesehatan" .

[106] Maulana et al., "Kyai, Platform Logic"; Zuhri et al., "Transforming Religious Authority"; Manzoor Ahmed Kalwar et al., "Aqidah in the Digital Age: Social Media, Religious Authority, and an Islamic Legal Framework," *Ulul Albab: Jurnal Studi dan Penelitian Hukum Islam* 9, no. 2 (2026): 192, https://doi.org/10.30659/jua.v9i2.51261.

[107] Bambang Subahri and Rio Febriannur Rachman, "Beyond Normative Preaching: How TikTok Reconstructs Local Wisdom-Based Da'wah in the Nahdlatul Ulama Community," *Muharrik: Jurnal Dakwah dan Sosial* 9, no. 1 (2026): 226–40, https://doi.org/10.37680/muharrik.v9i1.9906.

muʿamalah and worship is not inherently an asymmetry. Instead, the asymmetry lies in the management of risk within inherently permissible matters (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*): risks to collective systems—such as BPJS, donation funds, hajj packages, and state meal programs—are neutralized through *takyīf*, procedural formulas, and positive law, whereas risks to personal choices—such as ad revenue and visual self-presentation—are amplified through *iḥtiyāṭ* and *sadd al-dharīʿah*. The qunut and bowing cases, which lean toward permissiveness despite addressing individual practice, demonstrate that the primary dividing line is not between institutions and individuals but between collective order and personal choice. The Instagram formats selected by the institution present the former style as procedural authority and the latter as textual authority or unelaborated decree, rendering this asymmetry invisible within any single post. Authority over the ruling remains with the institution, while a portion of the practical application shifts to the comment sections.

By combining *uṣūl al-fiqh* with social media logic, this multi-layered analysis enables the distinction between mechanisms selected by the institution and compressions induced by formats. The strength of the corpus lies in its analytical depth rather than breadth: fourteen posts were examined alongside transcripts, captions, engagement metrics, and 196 coded comments. The limitations must be considered in relation to the claims they affect. First, internal assembly background papers and full broadcasts were not directly analyzed; therefore, claims are limited to *istinbāṭ* as presented within circulating posts, leaving unexamined whether intermediate analytical layers were applied during internal deliberations. Second, metrics were not normalized against follower counts or post ages, restricting engagement comparisons to descriptive evaluations within similar subgroups. Third, domains, formats, mufti types, and question types overlap within this small corpus; paired comparisons controlled for only a subset of these variables. Fourth, directed content analysis carries the risk of confirming initial categories; this risk was mitigated by reporting non-conforming instances but not eliminated. These limitations outline a future research agenda: ethnographic studies of fatwa drafting comparing internal papers with online posts, cross-institutional and cross-platform comparative studies, computational analyses of larger corpora, and reception studies examining how online fatwas are practiced by followers in daily life.

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The authors ensure that the datasets necessary to replicate the conclusions of this work are presented in their entirety within the article [and/or] its supplementary information.

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This study exclusively utilized publicly accessible data available at the time of archiving and involved no direct interaction with users. User identities in comment citations were anonymized, and comment contents were paraphrased.

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Appendix 1. Research Corpus

Table A1a. Post Identification and Metrics at Time of Archiving (October 12–13, 2026)

Code	Shortened Title	Upload Date	Account Owner & Collaboration	Format, Duration	Likes/ Comments/ Reposts	Archived Comments
QN	Congregants following a dawn *qunūt* imam	Oct 7, 2026	@fatwatv + 2 accounts	Clip, 1:46	4.5K / 123 / 444	86
MBG	Teachers eating leftover MBG meal allocations	Oct 5, 2026	@fatwatv + @dewanfatwapa	Clip, 2:05	646 / 3 / 48	3
ADS	YouTube AdSense revenue	Oct 3, 2026	@fatwatv + 2 accounts	Clip, 2:04	862 / 12 / 93	11
UMR	Umrah funded by usurious income	Sep 29, 2026	@fatwatv + 2 accounts	Clip, 1:43	120 / 0 / 11	0
DOA	Praying in Indonesian during salat	Sep 18, 2026	@fatwatv + 2 accounts	Clip, 1:41	2.9K / 21 / 320	19
BKK	Bowing as a gesture of respect	Aug 13, 2026	@fatwatv + @dewanfatwapa	Clip, 3:15	1.5K / 7 / 154	7
YSN	Reciting QS. Yāsīn	Sep 25, 2025	@dewanfatwapa (collab unrecorded)	Carousel, 7 slides	Unrecorded	2
SLF	Female Muslim selfies	Aug 22, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 2 accounts	Press release, 6:33	1.8K / 19 / 166	15
DNR	Donation funds for operational costs (Re-upload of DNS)	Aug 18, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 4 accounts	Press release, 5:21	296 / 3 / 15	3
FRD	Selling *furoda* hajj packages	Aug 15, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 4 accounts	Press release, 6:25	402 / 6 / 13	6

BPJS	BPJS Kesehatan (National Health Insurance)	Aug 14, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 4 accounts	Press release, 3:06	1.6K / 39 / 70	37
KFM	Hadith grading of *kaffaratul majelis* supplication	Aug 13, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 4 accounts	Press release, 4:52	450 / 2 / 14	2
DNS	Donation funds for operational costs	Aug 12, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + 4 accounts	Press release, 5:21	743 / 3 / 18	3
KRB	Storage of sacrificial meat by charitable foundations	Jun 2, 2025	@dewanfatwapa + @fatwatv	Carousel, 6 slides	185 / 3 / –	2

Note: Metric figures reflect screenshots captured at the time of archiving and are unnormalized; post ages range between five days and sixteen months. Archived comments include nested replies.

Table A1b. Analytical Variables per Fatwa

Code	Mufti	Subject Addressed	Query Type	Naṣṣ/ Chain/ Scholarly Citation	Visible Uṣūl Mechanism	Ruling Direction
QN	Individual (Ustadz Abdullah Roy)	Congregant in assembly	Legal status of worship practice	Yes / No / Yes (al-ʻUśaymīn)	*Ittibāʻ al-imām*	Permissive: follow the imam
MBG	Individual (Ustadz Iqbal Gunawan)	Teachers in state program	Customary law and property	No / No / No	Original permissibility; avoiding waste	Permissible
ADS	Individual (Ustadz Muhammad	Content creators	Property law	No / No / No	*Sadd al-żarīʻah*	Impermissible

	Haikal Basyarahiel)					
UMR	Individual (Ustadz Iqbal Gunawan)	Individual	Validity of worship and property	Meaning of Hadith / No / "Some scholars"	Distinguishing validity from reward	Structurally valid; spiritual reward questioned
DOA	Individual (Ustadz Abdullah Roy)	Individual	Legal status of worship practice	Yes / No / "Some *masyāyikh*"	*Iḥtiyāṭ*	Strict: non-Arabic prayers outside salat
BKK	Individual (Ustadz Abdullah Roy)	Individual in social custom	Customary law	Yes / "Graded *ḥasan* by some" / No	*Iḥtiyāṭ*; restricting theological judgment	Prohibited, but not polytheism (*syirk*)
YSN	Individual (Ustadz Emha Hasan Ayatulloh)	Individual (Mother teaching Qur'an)	Virtue of practice (*faḍīlah*)	Yes / Yes / Yes (Ibn al-Jawzī)	Hadith critique	Reciting permissible; belief in specific virtues restricted
SLF	Collective (13th Assembly)	Women	Customary law	No / No / Scholarly dispute cited	Original permissibility; *tarjīḥ*; *sadd al-żarīʿah*	Conditionally permissible; impermissible in certain categories; recommendation to avoid publication
DNS/DNR	Collective (13th Assembly)	Foundations, donors, collectors	Transactional law (*muʿāmalah*)	No / No / Scholarly dispute cited	*Tarjīḥ*; positive law as *murajjiḥ*	Impermissible if restricted; permissible if unrestricted under conditions

FRD	Collective (13th Assembly)	Agencies and pilgrims	Transactional law (*muʿāmalah*)	No / No / No	*Takyīf*; threshold of *gharar*; positive law	Conditionally permissible; hajj of pilgrims remains valid
BPJS	Collective (13th Assembly)	State, institutions, participants	Transactional law (*muʿāmalah*)	No / No / No	Procedural formula; *takyīf*	Permissible (across five decrees)
KFM	Collective (13th Assembly)	Individual	Hadith grading	Yes / Yes / Yes	Chain critique (*naqd al-sanad*)	Sunnah; *ḥasan* Hadith
KRB	Individual (Ustadz Muhammad Arifin Badri)	Foundations	Execution of sacrificial ritual	Yes / Source cited / "Some scholars"	Broadening general *naṣṣ*	Permissible

Appendix 2. Codebook

Table A2a. Operational Definitions of *Uṣūl* Mechanisms and Textual Indicators

Mechanism	Operational Definition	Example Indicators in Corpus
Procedural formula	Statement that evidence and scholarly opinions have been weighed without displaying their internal substance	"after assembling and deliberating in light of textual evidences"
Contractual *takyīf*	Categorization of a novel object or transaction into an established legal or contractual category	"*taʿāwunī* insurance, not commercial insurance"; *juʿālah* contract
Jurisprudential preference (*tarjīḥ*)	Explicit citation of scholarly disagreement followed by endorsing one opinion	"the stronger opinion"
Positive law as premise or *murajjiḥ*	Reference to state legality or regulations as a legal premise or corroborative factor	"in line with positive law in Indonesia"

Original permissibility (*aṣl al-ibāḥah*)	Reference to the default legal presumption of permissibility or absence of explicit prohibition	"the default rule of things is permissibility (*al-ibāḥah*)"; "as long as there is no prohibition"
Precaution (*iḥtiyāṭ*)	Selection of a stricter legal position based on cautionary reasoning	"more precautionary"
Blocking the means (*sadd al-żarīʿah*)	Prohibition or restriction of an otherwise permissible act because it leads to an impermissible outcome	advertisements that "cannot be filtered"; public distribution that "triggers temptation (*fitnah*)"
Chain critique (*naqd al-sanad*)	Assessment of Hadith authenticity grades or transmission chains	weak chains "mutually reinforce"; virtue Hadiths declared "fabricated"
Following the imam (*ittibāʿ al-imām*)	Jurisprudential maxim governing congregational prayer	"the imam is appointed to be followed"
Digital *iḥtiyāṭ*	Precaution or *sadd al-dharīʿah* whose core rationale rests specifically on platform dynamics	ad algorithms; image circulation on social media

Table A2b. Coding of Analytical Operations in Comments and Distribution

Code and Definition	**QN**	**BPJS**	**DOA**	**SLF**	**ADS**	**Others**	**Total**
A. Expressions of appreciation or prayer formulas lacking substantive content	13	19	7	9	3	18	69
B. Applying the ruling to one's personal circumstance	9	3	2	0	1	1	16
C. Querying or introducing case variants	7	2	4	0	1	4	18
D. Contesting the ruling or demanding scriptural evidence/documents	3	4	1	0	0	1	9
E. Presenting competing evidence, rulings, or alternative authorities	17	2	0	2	0	0	21
F. Answering or explaining rulings to fellow followers	17	4	3	2	0	1	27
G. Identity polemics and authority contestation	14	3	0	2	5	3	27
H. Miscellaneous (user tags, emojis, off-topic)	6	0	2	0	1	0	9
Total	**86**	**37**	**19**	**15**	**11**	**28**	**196**

Note: Each comment received a single primary code. Codes B through F are categorized as analytical operations executed by followers (91 comments total). “Others” includes BKK (7), FRD (6), MBG (3), DNR (3), DNS (3), YSN (2), KFM (2), and KRB (2); UMR recorded 0 comments.